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Abstract— In the standard Mechanism Design framework
(Hurwicz-Reiter [1]), there is a central authority that gathers
agents’ messages and subsequently determines the allocation
and tax for each agent. We consider a scenario where, due to
communication overhead and other constraints, such broadcast-
ing of messages to a central authority cannot take place. Instead,
only local message exchange is allowed between agents. As a re-
sult, each agent should be able to determine her own allocation
and tax based on the messages in the local neighborhood, as
defined by a given message graph describing the communication
constraints. This scenario gives rise to a novel research direction
that we call “Distributed Mechanism Design”. In this paper, we
propose such a distributed mechanism for the problem of rate
allocation in a multicast transmission network. The proposed
mechanism fully implements the optimal allocation in Nash
equilibria and its message space dimension is linear with respect
to the number of agents in the network.
Index Terms— mechanism design, rate allocation, decentral-
ized optimization, strategic users, Nash equilibrium
I. INTRODUCTION
Most of today’s networks consist of a large number of
heterogenous agents who have privacy constraints and may
act strategically. From the viewpoint of the designer/operator
of such networks, solving a resource allocation problem that
maximizes the social welfare of the whole network is a
difficult task since agents may not be willing to share some of
their private information related to their utilities. Appropriate
incentives have to be put in place to induce agents to reveal
their private information relevant to the welfare optimization
problem. An appropriate mathematical framework for this
setting is mechanism design that has been widely utilized in
such areas of research as market allocations [2]–[4], rate and
resource allocations [5]–[8], data security [9], etc.
In the standard Mechanism Design framework (Hurwicz-
Reiter [1]) it is required that agents transmit their messages
to a central authority, which in turn, determines allocation
and tax/subsidy for them. Equivalently, it is assumed that
agents broadcast their messages to each other and the central
authority and everyone can evaluate allocation and taxes
for everyone else. The motivation for this work is the
realistic scenario where such message transmission to a
central authority (or equivalently, broadcasting of messages)
cannot take place due to network communication constraints.
Indeed, in a large network, this may result in a significant
communication overhead even for small messages spaces.
To investigate this problem, we consider a setting in which
agents only transmit their messages to their neighboring
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agents, where neighborhoods are defined through an under-
lying message graph. Consequently, allocation and tax of
each agent must only depend on her neighbors’ messages.
In other words, each agent can determine her allocation
and tax based on the messages she hears and therefore,
there is no need for a central authority. This implies that,
unlike standard mechanisms, the designed allocation and tax
functions cannot have the whole message space as their
domain; instead the allocation and tax function for each agent
should only depend on the neighborhood messages. This
additional restriction gives rise to a new research direction
that we call “Distributed Mechanism Design” (DMD). A
complementary view of DMD stems from the literature of
distributed optimization (e.g., [10], [11]). In distributed opti-
mization agents do exchange local messages in order to solve
a centralized allocation problem. It is assumed however, that
agents are not strategic–infact they are automata–and execute
a predefined message exchange algorithm. DMD can be
thought of as the generalization of distributed optimization
to account for strategic agents, i.e. for settings where we
can no longer assume that agents will execute a distributed
message passing algorithm unless the designer puts in place
appropriate incentives for them to do so. Note that DMD
is not to be confused with the literature of distributed opti-
mization that attempts to resolve “privacy” issues by means
of dithering (i.e. adding noise to) the exchanged messages as
in [12]. In that area of research agents are given some privacy
guarantees, but are still considered non-strategic automata.
In this paper, we propose a distributed mechanism for
rate allocation in a multicast transmission network. A non-
distributed mechanism for efficient allocation in multicast
networks has been proposed in [6], [8] and our model closely
follows these works. The current work builds on a distributed
mechanism for Walrasian and Lindahl allocation in private
and public goods, respectively, that was proposed in [13]
[14, Ch. 4], as well as the distributed mechanism for unicast
networks proposed in [15]. The contributions of this paper
are as follows. The proposed mechanism is (a) distributed, it
(b) fully implements the optimal allocation in Nash equilibria
(NE) (i.e. there are no extraneous equilibria), and (c) its
message space dimension is linear with respect to the number
of agents in the network. Furthermore, the mechanism is (d)
individually rational and (e) weak budget balanced at the NE.
We have utilized an idea similar to the radial allocation [4]–
[6] to achieve feasibility at NE. Unlike the mechanism in [13]
that defines messages with dimensionality per user growing
linearly with the number of users, in this work, the message
dimensionality of each agent is linear with respect to the
size of her neighborhood and this is a result of utilizing
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“summary” messages (see [14, Ch. 4], [15]).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
the model and problem formulation are discussed. Section III
presents the proposed distributed mechanism by stating all
of the properties of message communication network and
defining allocation and tax functions. In Section IV, the
properties of the designed mechanism are explained and
the main results are presented. In Section V, an alternative
mechanism is discussed for relaxing an assumption on the
message network. We conclude in Section VI with some
comments on message dimensions and a discussion of the
results. The proofs of the intermediate lemmas can be found
in the extended version of this paper [16].
II. MODEL
We are following closely the model developed in [6].
We consider a multicast network consisting of multiple
sources K = {1, ...,K} and strategic receivers (which are
called agents) N = {1, ..., N} in which data is transmitted
from each source to multiple agents. Hence, the agents are
classified into K groups denoted by K = {1, ...,K} based
on their data source. The set of agents in group k (agents
having the same source k) are denoted by Gk and Gk is
the number of them. The group of agent i is denoted by
k(i). Since agents in each group receive data from the same
source, one common data stream can be transmitted in each
link shared by some of the agents of the same group and
the rate of the common data stream is the maximum of the
demanded rates by those agents. In other words, every source
transmits the common data of agents of its group in each link
by the best quality demanded and each agent can regenerate
her own data by sampling from the received data stream to
get her desirable quality. This scenario is as if agents inside
a group share the bandwidth with each other but they have
competition for it with other groups which is referred to as
intergroup competition and intragroup sharing in [6]. One
example of multicast transmission is illustrated in Fig. 1.
The network links are denoted by L = {1, ..., L}, each of
which has capacity cl. Agent i’s data stream is transmitted
via links Li ⊂ L with |Li| = Li. For each link l, agents
using it are denoted by N l with |N l| = N l and we denote
N l ∩ Gk by Glk. Further, Kl is the subset of groups that are
using link l and its cardinality is denoted by |Kl| = Kl. We
assume Kl ≥ 2 that is at least two groups use each link l
and this is for having competition in using each link.
The data rate of agent i is denoted by xi and the vector of
allocated rates is x = (x1, ..., xN ). Agent i has a valuation
over her data rate that is modeled by the function vi(xi).
The following assumptions are imposed on the valuation
functions. We know that for every i ∈ N , vi(.) ∈ V0, where
V0 is the set of strictly concave, monotonically increasing,
twice differentiable and R+ → R functions with continuous
second derivatives.
The designer’s goal is to maximize the social welfare,
which is the summation of the agents’ valuations, by de-
termining the efficient x that is consistent with the capacity
constraints of network and the multicast aspect. Therefore,
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Fig. 1. Network with multicast transmission. Even though both R1 and
R2 use link T1-A, it is only loaded with the rate max{x1, x2} due to the
multicast transmission.
we formulate the following optimization problem,
max
x
∑
i∈N
vi(xi) (1a)
s.t. xi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N (1b)
and
∑
k∈Kl
max
i∈Glk
{xi} ≤ cl ∀l ∈ L. (1c)
Generally, problem (1) can also model unicast transmis-
sion and a number of other scenarios of network utility
maximization with linear inequality constraints.
A. Necessary and Sufficient Optimality Conditions
We utilize KKT conditions to characterize the solution of
problem (1), but first we need to rewrite it in another form
to change it to a convex optimization problem. We introduce
the variable blk for each l ∈ L and k ∈ Kl that represents the
maximum demand of agents in group k that use link l. It is
straightforward to show that problem (1) and the one below
are equivalent,
max
x
∑
i∈N
vi(xi) (2a)
s.t. xi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N (2b)
and
∑
k∈Kl
blk ≤ cl ∀l ∈ L (2c)
and xi ≤ blk ∀l ∈ L, k ∈ Kl, i ∈ Glk. (2d)
In this problem, the valuation functions are concave and
all of the constraints are affine. Therefore, problem (2) is
a convex optimization problem and hence, KKT conditions
are necessary and sufficient for its solution. We use dual
variables λ and µ as follows. λ = {λl, l ∈ L}, each of
which corresponds to one of the constraints in (2c) and
µ = {µli,∀l ∈ L, i ∈ N l}, each of which corresponds to one
constraint in (2d). We can write KKT conditions at optimal
point (x∗, b∗, λ∗, µ∗) as
(a) Primal Feasibility: x∗ and b∗ satisfy (2b) and (2c) and
(2d).
(b) Dual Feasibility: λ∗l ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ L and µli
∗ ≥ 0 ∀l ∈
L, i ∈ N l.
(c) Complimentary Slackness:
λ∗l (c
l −
∑
k∈Kl
blk
∗
) = 0 ∀l ∈ L, (3a)
µli
∗
(x∗i − blk
∗
) = 0 ∀l ∈ L, k ∈ Kl, i ∈ Glk. (3b)
(d) Stationarity:
v′i(x
∗
i ) =
∑
l∈Li
µli
∗ ∀i ∈ N if x∗i > 0, (3c)
v′i(x
∗
i ) ≤
∑
l∈Li
µli
∗ ∀i ∈ N if x∗i = 0, (3d)
λ∗l =
∑
i∈Glk
µli
∗ ∀l ∈ L, k ∈ Kl. (3e)
III. DISTRIBUTED MECHANISM
The designed mechanism consists of a message spaceMi
for every agent i ∈ N and allocation and tax functions
that are denoted by xˆi(.) and tˆi(.), respectively. These
functions depend only on neighboring agents’ messages and
this is why this mechanism is “distributed”. We can char-
acterize the mechanism completely by specifying the tuple
(M, (xˆi(.))i∈N , (tˆi(.))i∈N ) whereM = (M1× ...×MN ).
This mechanism induces a game G = (N ,M, (uˆi(.))i∈N ),
where the utility functions are uˆi(m) = vi(xˆi(m))− tˆi(m).
The set of all Nash equilibria of the game G is denoted by
NE .
A. Message Network
As mentioned earlier, the mechanism is distributed in
the sense that message transmission is done locally. This
is modeled by a message transmission network that is an
undirected graph in which agents are denoted by nodes and
an edge between two agents indicates that these two agents
hear each others’ messages. Otherwise, they do not have
access to each others’ messages due to communication (or
complexity) constraints. This network is called “message
network”. Notice that the message network is different from
the data transmission network related to problem (1). The
message network enables the decentralized solution of that
problem and is relevant even for the more general scenarios
that can be modeled by problem (1). In Fig. 2, the two
networks are illustrated.
Agent 3
Agent 2
Agent 1
Agent 4
Node 1
Node 2
Node 3
Node 4
Source 1
Source 2
Message 
Network
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Allocation 
Network
Fig. 2. Message network vs. resource allocation network
We consider an arbitrary spanning tree on the graph of the
message network and assume message transmission is done
via this tree which will be referred to as the “message graph”
and denoted by GR = (N , E). For all i ∈ N , N (i) is the set
of neighbors of agent i in GR and |N (i)| = N(i). Further,
n(i, j) is agent i’s neighbor which is on the shortest path
from i to j. Also, N l(i) denotes the set of agents in N (i)
using link l ∈ Li and |N l(i)| = N l(i). For each agent i ∈
N , the function Φ(i) arbitrarily chooses one agent j ∈ N (i)
and we define the set Ii = {h ∈ N (i) : Φ(h) = i}. The
role of this function will become evident in the rest of this
section where we describe the allocation and tax functions.
The following assumption is imposed on the message
graph for simplicity of exposition.
Assumption 1: For each link l ∈ L, the sub-graph consist-
ing of agents i ∈ N l is a connected graph. Also, for each
link l ∈ L and group k ∈ Kl, there is at least one node
i ∈ Glk that is connected to all other nodes j ∈ Glk and is
denoted by c(k, l).
For each agent i ∈ N , set Ci is defined as the set of links l
for which c(k(i), l) = i.
In Section V, a relaxed assumption is imposed on the
message graph and an alternative mechanism is proposed.
B. Message Components
The message mi=(yi, yi, ni, qi, pi, wi, zi, ai) is quoted by
agent i in this mechanism. The reason for such a complex
message structure stems form the fact that (a) all agents
within a group Glk need access to the maximum demanded
rate in that group and (b) this information needs to be
disseminated to all agents in the network while satisfying
the communication constraints. In the following, we give
intuitive explanations for the meaning of each of the eight
message components. The first message, yi ∈ R+, is the
agent’s demanded rate. The second message is defined as
yi = (yi
l, l ∈ Li) ∈ RLi+ , where, each of the messages
yi
l is capturing whether the specific agent belongs in the
group of agents that demand the maximum rate within the
group Glk(i). We call these messages as proxies of the “group
demand”. Specifically, at NE, this message will become zero
if the agent is not in the max group, and otherwise, it will
be equal to the maximum demanded rate of group Glk(i)
divided by the number of users in the max group. The third
message, ni = (n
j,l
i , j ∈ N (i), l ∈ L) ∈ RL×N(i)+ , consists
of components nj,li , each of which is a proxy for the sum of
group demands of the agents h ∈ N l with n(i, h) = j. These
messages are referred to as “summary” messages. The fourth
message, qi = (q
j
i , j ∈ Ii) ∈ R|Ii|+ , consists of elements qji ,
each of which is a proxy for agent j’s demand. The fifth
message consists of two components, pi = (1pi,
2pi). The
first component is defined as 1pi = (
1p
l
i, l ∈ Li) ∈ R+Li ,
where each message 1pli is the price that agent i is willing
to pay for using link l. This is essentially a proxy for the
dual variable µli
∗ that appears in the KKT conditions (3).
The second component is defined as 2pi = (
2p
j,l
i , j ∈
Ii, l ∈ Lj) ∈ R
(
∑
j∈Ii Lj)
+ , where each variable
2p
j,l
i is
the price that agent i thinks agent j should pay for using
link l. The sixth message, wi = (wli, l ∈ Li) ∈ RLi+ ,
consists of components wli, each of which is a proxy for
the price that group k(i) is willing to pay for link l. These
messages have to converge at NE to the dual variable λl∗
in the KKT conditions (3) for all users i ∈ N l. The seventh
message is defined as zi = (1zi, 2zi). The first component
1zi = (
1z
l
i, l ∈ Ci) ∈ R+|Ci| consists of elements 1zli, each
of which is a proxy for maximum value of demands of agents
in Glk(i). Further, 2zi = (2z
l
i, l ∈ Ci) ∈ R+|Ci| consists
of elements 2zli, each of which is a proxy for the number
of agents that have maximum demand in Glk(i). Finally, the
eighth message, ai = (1ai, 2ai), consists of two components.
The first component, 1ai = (1a
l
i, l ∈ Li) ∈ RLi++, is
a vector of messages that have technical roles and will
be useful in having efficient NE. The second component,
2ai = (
2a
j,l
i , j ∈ Ii, l ∈ Lj) ∈ R
(
∑
j∈Ii Lj)
++ , consists of the
elements 2aj,li , each of which is a proxy for the message
1a
l
j .
For each agent i ∈ N and every link l ∈ L, we define yli
as the extension of yil to every link l ∈ L,
yli =
{
yi
l if l ∈ Li
0 oth.
(4)
For each agent i ∈ N and l ∈ Li, 1z¯li and 2z¯li are defined
as
1z¯
l
i =
{
max{qiΦ(i),maxj∈Glk(i),j 6=i{yj}} if l ∈ Ci
1z
l
c(k(i),l) if l /∈ Ci
(5a)
2z¯
l
i=
{
1{qi
Φ(i)
}(1z¯
l
i)+
∑
j∈Gl
k(i)
,j 6=i 1{yj}(
1z¯li) if l ∈ Ci
2z
l
c(k(i),l) if l /∈ Ci
(5b)
where 1 is the indicator function (1{α}(β) is equal to 1 only
if α = β). We have defined 1z¯li so that each agent i ∈ N l
gets aware of the maximum demand of agents j ∈ Glk(i) at
NE, and it is calculated by her as a function of her neighbors’
messages. Similarly, at NE, 2z¯li is the number of agents with
maximum demand among all of the agents j ∈ Glk(i).
C. Allocation Functions
We utilize an idea similar to the radial allocation [6] to
have feasible allocation at NE. With this goal in mind, the
allocation function is defined as
xˆi(m) = ri yi, (6a)
where ri is agent i’s radial allocation factor, ri = minl∈L c
l
f li
,
and for l ∈ Li, f li is defined as
f li =
qiΦ(i)1{qiΦ(i)}(
1z¯
l
i)
2z¯li
+
∑
j∈N (i)
(ylj+
∑
h∈N (j),h6=i
nh,lj ), (6b)
and for l /∈ Li, f li is defined as
f li =
∑
j∈N (i)
(ylj +
∑
h∈N (j),h 6=i
nh,lj ). (6c)
Since agents don’t have access to all of the messages, for
each agent i, we should define a proxy, f li , for the sum
of group demands of agents on link l to enable feasible
allocation at NE. Note that the quantity f li does not depend
on agent i’s messages.
D. Tax Functions
The tax functions are tˆi(m) = tˆci(m)+
∑
l∈L tˆ
l
i(m), where
tˆci(m)=
∑
j∈Ii
∑
l∈Lj
((2p
j,l
i − 1plj)2 + (2aj,li − 1alj)2)+
∑
j∈Ii
(qji −yj)2
(7a)
and for each component tˆli(m) we have three cases.
For l ∈ Li, l /∈ Ci, it is defined as
tˆli(m) =
2p
i,l
Φ(i)xˆi(m) +
∑
j∈N (i)
(nj,li − ylj −
∑
h∈N (j),h6=i
nh,lj )
2
+ (yi
l−
qiΦ(i)1{qiΦ(i)}(
1z¯
l
i)
2z¯li
)2 + w¯l−i(wˆ
l
i − w¯l−i)(cl − rif li )2
+ (wˆli − w¯l−i)2 + 2pi,lΦ(i)(1pli −2pi,lΦ(i))(1z¯li − qiΦ(i))2
+ (wli − wlc(k(i),l))2.
(7b)
For l ∈ Li, l ∈ Ci, we have
tˆli(m) =
2p
i,l
Φ(i)xˆi(m) +
∑
j∈N (i)
(nj,li − ylj −
∑
h∈N (j),h6=i
nh,lj )
2
+ (yi
l −
qiΦ(i)1{qiΦ(i)}(
1z¯
l
i)
2z¯li
)2 + (1zli − 1z¯li)2 + (2zli − 2z¯li)2
+ (wli − 2pi,lΦ(i) −
∑
j∈Gl
k(i)
,j 6=i
1plj)
2 + w¯l−i(wˆ
l
i − w¯l−i)(cl − rif li )2
+ (wˆli − w¯l−i)2 + 2pi,lΦ(i)(1pli − 2pi,lΦ(i))(1z¯li − qiΦ(i))2,
(7c)
where for each link l and agent i ∈ N l, wˆli is defined as
wˆli =

∑
j∈Gl
k(i)
1plj + (
1a
l
i − 2ai,lΦ(i)) if l ∈ Ci
wlc(k(i),l) − 2p
i,l
Φ(i) +
1p
l
i + (
1a
l
i − 2ai,lΦ(i)) if l /∈ Ci
(7d)
Further, w¯l−i is defined as
w¯l−i =
1
N l(i)
∑
j∈N l(i)
wlj . (7e)
Finally, for l /∈ Li, tax is
tˆli(m) =
∑
j∈N (i)
(nj,li − ylj −
∑
h∈N (j),h6=i
nh,lj )
2. (7f)
Intuitively, the tax functions provide some penalties to in-
centivize agents for quoting messages in a desirable manner.
With this goal in mind, taxes contain three types of terms.
The first type is a rate times price component (e.g., the
first term in (7b)). The second type consists of quadratic
terms that at NE will become zero and thus can be thought
of as incentivizing agents to come to a consensus (e.g.,
all terms in (7b) other than the first, the fourth and the
sixth). This enables the mechanism to provide proxies for
the missing information of agents at NE, in addition to the
requirements of having efficient allocation at NE. The third
type relates to the complimentary slackness conditions in (3)
(e.g., the fourth and the sixth term in (7b)). The reason of
defining different tax functions is that different incentives are
required for different agents. For instance, for each link l and
k ∈ Kl, agent c(k, l) should announce the proper messages
that convey information about other agents in Glk so that all
of them can have consensus on their group demands on link
l at NE. Furthermore, each agent i has to pay a tax even
for links l /∈ Li, which is required for consensus about the
“summary” messages. The intuition about each tax term will
become more evident from the results of Section IV.
IV. MECHANISM PROPERTIES
Fact 1: The mechanism (M, xˆ, tˆ) is distributed.
This can be observed from the definition of allocation and
tax functions that are only generated based on each agent’s
own messages and her neighboring agents’ messages.
Theorem 1: (Full Implementation, Individual Rationality
and Weak Budget Balance) At each Nash equilibrium m ∈
NE of the game G, the allocation vector xˆ(m) is efficient;
i.e. it is equal to the solution, x∗, of problem (1). In addition,
for each agent, individual rationality is satisfied at all NE.
Further, the game G is weak budget balanced at all NE.
Since x∗ is unique and according to Theorem 1, for all
m ∈ NE , the allocation vector xˆ(m) is unique.
Before proving Theorem 1, some lemmas are presented
that are necessary for its proof.
Lemma 2: (Concavity) The function uˆi(mi,m−i) is
strictly concave w.r.t. mi.
The strict concavity of uˆi(mi,m−i) w.r.t. mi helps us
calculate the best response functions by setting the gradient
of uˆi(mi,m−i) w.r.t. mi to be equal to zero. Yet, it is not
always possible for all of the elements of the gradient vector
to be set to zero. In this case, those elements are either
always positive or always negative. If any of the elements
were always positive, then as message spaces are unbounded
from above, there is no best response. Otherwise, if any of
the elements of the gradient vector were always negative, the
best response would be zero for that element.
Lemma 3: At any m ∈ NE , the following equations hold
for any i ∈ N .
qji = yj , ∀j ∈ Ii (8a)
yi
l =
qiΦ(i)1{qiΦ(i)}(
1z¯
l
i)
2z¯li
, ∀l ∈ Li (8b)
2pj,li =
1p
l
j , ∀j ∈ Ii, l ∈ Lj (8c)
wli =
{
wlc(k(i),l) if l ∈ Li, l /∈ Ci
2pi,lΦ(i) +
∑
j∈Gl
k(i)
,j 6=i
1plj if l ∈ Li, l ∈ Ci (8d)
nj,li = y
l
j +
∑
h∈N (j),h6=i
nh,lj , ∀l ∈ L, j ∈ N (i) (8e)
1zli =
1z¯
l
i = max{qiΦ(i), max
j∈Gl
k(i)
,j 6=i
yj}, ∀l ∈ Li, l ∈ Ci (8f)
2zli =
2z¯
l
i = 1{qi
Φ(i)
}
(
1z¯li
)
+
∑
j∈Gl
k(i)
,j 6=i
1{yj}
(
1z¯li
)
,∀l ∈ Li, l ∈ Ci
(8g)
2aj,li =
1a
l
j , ∀j ∈ Ii, l ∈ Lj (8h)
This lemma makes precise the comment made earlier about
quadratic terms in the tax functions. At NE, agents force
these quadratic terms to zero thus achieving consensus. Also,
this lemma explains how summary messages are able to sum
up the group demands of all agents using link l at NE.
Lemma 4: (Primal Feasibility) At any m ∈ NE of the
game G, the allocation vector xˆ(m) is feasible.
Lemma 5: At any m ∈ NE of the game G, the following
constraints hold for all i ∈ N and l ∈ Li,
wˆli = w¯
l
−i (9a)
w¯l−i(c
l − rif li ) = 0 (9b)
2p
i,l
Φ(i)(
1z¯
l
i − qiΦ(i)) = 0 (9c)
Similarly, this Lemma shows how different groups form
a consensus on the price of using each link l. Further,
it provides the two complimentary slackness terms of the
KKT conditions (3). In the proof of Theorem 1 we will see
precisely how these expressions are utilized.
Lemma 6: The following constraints hold at any m ∈ NE
of the game G,
v′i(xˆi(m)) =
∑
l∈Li
1p
l
i if xˆi(m) > 0, (10a)
v′i(xˆi(m)) ≤
∑
l∈Li
1p
l
i if xˆi(m) = 0. (10b)
We will see how this lemma will be related to the stationarity
term of the KKT conditions (3) in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 7: (Individual Rationality and Weak Budget Bal-
ance) At any m ∈ NE of the game G, individual rationality
is satisfied, vi(xˆi(m)) − tˆi(m) ≥ vi(0), ∀i ∈ N . Also, the
mechanism is weak budget balanced,
∑
i∈N tˆi(m) ≥ 0.
Lemma 8: There exists a NE, m ∈ NE , for the game G.
We are now ready to state the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof 1 (Proof of Theorem 1): In the proof of Lemma 8,
we show that the message associated to the solution of
problem (2) is a NE of the game G. Now, we want to
prove that all of the NE of the game G generate allocation
and prices that are efficient for problem (2). Consider any
m ∈ NE , due to Lemmas 3, 4, 5 and 6, the allocation
vector, xˆ(m), as x∗, ri1z¯li as b
l∗
k(i) (any rj
1z¯lj , j ∈ Glk(i)
could work too) and the variables 1pli and w
l
i (or any w
l
j
for j ∈ N l) as µli∗ and λ∗l , respectively, satisfy the KKT
conditions (3). Therefore, xˆ(m) = x∗ for any m ∈ NE
and hence, the allocation of all NE is unique and efficient.
Also, due to Lemma 8, we know at least one NE exists and
therefore, the mechanism fully implements problem (2) or
equivalently problem (1) at its Nash equilibria. Furthermore,
Lemma 7 proves individual rationality and weak budget
balance properties.
V. RELAXING THE ASSUMPTIONS ON MESSAGE
NETWORK
The primary reason of imposing Assumption 1 is that there
should be a consensus on the prices of different groups using
link l at NE and this is not implementable by the proposed
mechanism if the sub-graph of agents using link l is not
connected. In this section, we propose an alternative extended
mechanism that relaxes Assumption 1. The relaxed version
of Assumption 1, that is used in this section, is as follows.
Assumption 2: For each link l ∈ L and group k ∈ Kl,
there is at least one node i ∈ Glk that is connected to all
other nodes j ∈ Glk and is denoted by c(k, l).
Note that Assumption 2 only consists of the second part of
Assumption 1.
In the alternative mechanism, we extend the agents that
quote message wli from the agents using link l to a bigger
group of agents as follows. For every link l, consider a
connected sub-graph GRl = (Nl, El) consisting of all agents
i ∈ N l in addition to the minimum number of other agents
that do not use link l and are required to make the sub-graph
connected. This connected sub-graph is called link l’s sub-
graph and we know that it exists due to the connectivity
of the message graph. For each agent i, the set of links
l /∈ Li which i ∈ Nl are denoted by Li with |Li| = Li. The
extended definition of message wi is wi = (wli, l ∈ Li ∪Li)
and subsequently, the definition of N l(i) is modified as
N l(i) = {j, j ∈ N (i) ∩Nl} ∀i ∈ N , l ∈ Li ∪ Li. (11)
The tax functions are also modified. For l ∈ Li,
tˆli(m)=
∑
j∈N (i)
(nj,li − ylj −
∑
h∈N (j),h 6=i
nh,lj )
2
+ (wli − w¯l−i)2 + w¯l−i(wli − w¯l−i)(cl − rif li )2.
(12)
Since sub-graph of agents using each link l may not be
connected, we need other agents i /∈ N l to quote wli
messages and help the agents j ∈ N l in forming a consensus
on the group prices of using link l. This is why two terms
have been added to the tax function above that impose
required conditions for the message wli. The tax function
does not change for l ∈ Li. For l /∈ Li∪Li, the tax function
is the same as the l /∈ Li case for the original mechanism.
It is straightforward to prove almost the same results for
this mechanism. Therefore, this mechanism also fully Nash
implements problem (1), has individual rationality property
at NE and is weak budget balanced at NE.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a distributed mechanism for the multicast
transmission network that is applicable to a number of other
scenarios with linear constraints and proved that it fully Nash
implements the solution of problem (1). The main feature of
this work is that message transmission is done locally via
an underlying message network, in contrary to the standard
mechanism design framework that allows message transmis-
sion throughout the whole network. The dimensionality of
agent i’s message in the main mechanism (with Assumption
1) is Mi = 1 + 4Li + N(i)L + |Ii| + 2
∑
j∈Ii Lj + 2|Ci|.
Since the function Φ(i) chooses one agent j ∈ N (i), the
average size of the set Ii is 1. Also, we know that for
each link l and group k ∈ Kl, there is one agent denoted
by c(k, l) and hence, the average size of |Ci| is
∑
l∈LK
l
N .
Consequently, if we denote Ei∈N (N(i)) and Ei∈N (Li) by N¯
and L¯ respectively, the average size of the whole network’s
message is
E(
∑
i∈N
Mi)= N(2 + 4L¯+ N¯L+ 2
∑
i∈N Li
N
+ 2
∑
l∈LK
l
N
)
(13)
which obviously grows linearly with the number of agents
in the network, N .
For the alternative mechanism, an extra term will be added
to the message dimensionality of the whole network and that
is NEi∈N (Li). This is due to the extra messages quoted by
agents to preserve the connectivity of message passing.
Message dimensionality in our mechanism is more ef-
ficient than the message dimensionality of the distributed
mechanism proposed in [13] which grows with N2 and
it may be a consequence of learning guarantees that the
proposed mechanism has.
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VII. APPENDIX
Proof 2 (Proof of Lemma 2): In order to show the strict
concavity of uˆi(mi,m−i), we can show that its Hessian
matrix, H, w.r.t. mi is negative definite and this is doable
because the function uˆi(mi,m−i) is twice differentiable w.r.t
mi. It is obvious that cross derivatives of uˆi(mi,m−i) w.r.t.
different components of mi are zero which are the non-
diagonal elements of H. Hence, we consider the diagonal
elements and show that they are all negative.
It is straightforward to show that the second partial
derivative of uˆi(m) w.r.t. all elements of messages ni, qi,
pi, wi, zi, ai and yi is equal to −2. The only message
element left is yi and the second partial derivative w.r.t. it
is ∂
2uˆi(m)
(∂yi)2
= ∂
2vi(riyi)
(∂yi)2
= ri
∂2vi(xˆi)
(∂xˆi)2
. Since vi(xˆi) is strictly
concave w.r.t. xˆi,
∂2uˆi(m)
(∂yi)2
< 0. Note that ri doesn’t consist of
any of agent i’s messages and so it is assumed as a constant.
Therefore, since all of the diagonal elements of H are
negative and non-diagonal elements are zero, matrix H is
negative definite. We conclude that uˆi(mi,m−i) is strictly
concave w.r.t. mi.
Proof 3 (Proof of Lemma 3): At NE, every agent is best
responding to other agents’ messages and in order to find
the relation between these messages, one can calculate the
best response functions. Each of the results in this lemma
corresponds to one of agent i’s messages and its relation with
the messages of other agents. Therefore, all of the results can
be directly derived by setting each of their corresponding
element of gradient to zero. For all agents i ∈ N , we have
∂uˆi(mi,m−i)
∂qji
= 0⇒ 2(qji − yj) = 0⇒ qji = yj ,∀j ∈ Ii
As mentioned in the description of message components, qji
can be used as a proxy for yj at NE and yet, agent j can
not change it.
∂uˆi(mi,m−i)
∂(yil)
= 0⇒ 2(yil −
qiΦ(i)1{qiΦ(i)}(
1z¯
l
i)
2z¯li
) = 0
⇒ yil =
qiΦ(i)1{qiΦ(i)}(
1z¯
l
i)
2z¯li
, ∀l ∈ Li
∂uˆi(mi,m−i)
∂(2pj,li )
= 0⇒ 2(2pj,li − 1p
l
j) = 0⇒ 2pj,li = 1plj ,
∀j ∈ Ii, l ∈ Lj
∂uˆi(mi,m−i)
∂wli
= 0⇒ 2(wli − wlc(k(i),l)) = 0
⇒ wli = wlc(k(i),l), ∀l ∈ Li, l /∈ Ci
∂uˆi(mi,m−i)
∂wli
= 0⇒ 2(wli − 2pi,lΦ(i) −
∑
j∈Gl
k(i)
,j 6=i
1plj) = 0
⇒ wli = 2pi,lΦ(i) +
∑
j∈Gl
k(i)
,j 6=i
1plj , ∀l ∈ Li, l ∈ Ci
In all cases above, it is doable to have these relations because
both right-hand sides of equations are non-negative.
∂uˆi(mi,m−i)
∂nj,li
= 0⇒ 2(nj,li − ylj −
∑
h∈N (j),h 6=i
nh,lj ) = 0
⇒ nj,li = ylj +
∑
h∈N (j),h 6=i
nh,lj , ∀j ∈ N (i), l ∈ L
Using a similar argument as the one used in [14, p. 131] we
can prove that
nj,li =
∑
h∈N ,n(i,h)=j
ylh (14)
and consequently, ∑
j∈N (i)
nj,li =
∑
h∈N ,h6=i
ylh (15)
Next, we show the remaining results that are about the
message elements of zi and 2ai.
∂uˆi(mi,m−i)
∂(1zli)
= 0⇒ 2(1zli − 1z¯li) = 0⇒ 1zli = 1z¯li
∀l ∈ Li, l ∈ Ci
∂uˆi(mi,m−i)
∂(2zli)
= 0⇒ 2(2zli − 2z¯li) = 0⇒ 2zli = 2z¯li
∀l ∈ Li, l ∈ Ci
∂uˆi(mi,m−i)
∂(2aj,li )
= 0⇒2(2aj,li −1a
l
j)=0⇒ 2aj,li =1alj
∀j ∈ Ii, l ∈ Lj
Proof 4 (Proof of Lemma 4): According to Lemma 3, the
following relation holds at NE,
f li =
∑
j∈N
ylj
Note that it implies that all of the agents i ∈ N have the
same f li and consequently the same ri at NE. Further, due
to Lemma 3,
ylj =
{
yj
nk,lmax
if l ∈ Lj , yj = maxi∈Gl
k(j)
{yi}
0 oth.
where nk,lmax is the number of agents j ∈ Glk with yj =
maxi∈Gl
k(j)
{yi}. Consequently, ∀l ∈ L, we can write∑
k∈Kl
max
i∈Glk
{xˆi} =
∑
k∈Kl
max
i∈Glk
{riyi}
≤ c
l∑
j∈N y
l
j
∑
k∈Kl
max
i∈Glk
{yi} = c
l∑
j∈N y
l
j
∑
i∈N
yli = c
l
Which proves that the allocation at NE is feasible.
Proof 5 (Proof of Lemma 5): We first prove result (9a).
Assume ∃i ∈ N , l ∈ Li so that wˆli 6= w¯l−i. Since, wli = wˆli at
NE, it implies that ∃i, j ∈ N l, wˆli 6= wˆlj and therefore there
exists an agent h ∈ N l for which wˆlh > w¯l−h or equivalently,
wˆlh = w¯
l
−h +  for some  > 0. We will show that agent h
has a profitable deviation by decreasing his message 1alh to
1a
l′
h =
1a
l
h − ′ > 0 for some 0 < ′ < . Consequently
wˆl
′
h = wˆ
l
h − ′ = w¯l−h + − ′ = w¯l−h + ′′. We can write
uˆh(.,
1a
l′
h)− uˆh(., 1alh) =
− ′′2 − w¯l−h′′(cl − rhf lh)2 + 2 + w¯l−h(cl − rhf lh)2
= 2 − ′′2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ w¯l−h(− ′′)(cl − rhf lh)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
> 0
and we conclude that at any NE, wˆli = w¯
l
−i, ∀i ∈ N , l ∈ Li.
Now we prove result (9b). Suppose ∃i ∈ N , l ∈ Li so that
w¯l−i(c
l−rif li ) 6= 0. It implies w¯l−i > 0 and (cl−rif li )2 > 0.
We show that agent i benefits from deviating to 1al
′
i =
1a
l
i−
 > 0, for some  > 0. According to the first result of this
lemma, w¯li = w¯
l
−i and we have
uˆi(.,
1a
l′
i )− uˆi(., 1ali) = −2 + w¯l−i(cl − rif li )2
= (−+ w¯l−i(cl − rif li )2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0, Due to assumption
) = (−+ α) > 0, for  < α
Since α > 0 , profitable deviation by positive  is possible
and the result is proved.
Proving the result (9c) is similar to the result (9b). Assume
∃i ∈ N , l ∈ Li so that 2pi,lΦ(i)(1z¯li − qiΦ(i)) 6= 0. It implies
that 2pi,lΦ(i) > 0 and (
1z¯
l
i − qiΦ(i))2 > 0. Due to Lemma
3, 2pi,lΦ(i) =
1p
l
i and so
1p
l
i > 0. We prove agent i has a
profitable deviation to 1pl
′
i =
1p
l
i − > 0, for some  > 0.
uˆi(.,
1p
l′
i )− uˆi(., 1pli) = −()2 + 2pi,lΦ(i)(1z¯li − qiΦ(i))2
= (−+ 2pi,lΦ(i)(1z¯li − qiΦ(i))2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0, Due to assumption
)= (−+ α)>0, for  < α
Since α > 0, agent i can profit by deviating with positive 
and the result is proved.
Proof 6 (Proof of Lemma 6): If xˆi(m) > 0, then yi > 0
and hence, the partial derivative of uˆi(mi,m−i) w.r.t. yi must
be zero at NE. Therefore,
∂uˆi(mi,m−i)
∂yi
= 0⇒ (∂uˆi(mi,m−i)
∂xˆi(m)
)
dxˆi(m)
dyi
= 0
⇒ (v′i(xˆi(m))−
∑
l∈Li
2p
i,l
Φ(i))ri = 0⇒v′i(xˆi(m)) =
∑
l∈Li
1p
l
i
Note that ri 6= 0. If xˆi = 0, then yi = 0 and therefore,
the partial derivative of uˆi(mi,m−i) w.r.t. yi must not be
positive at NE. Hence,
∂uˆi(mi,m−i)
∂yi
≤ 0⇒ (∂uˆi(mi,m−i)
∂xˆi(m)
)
dxˆi(m)
dyi
≤ 0
⇒ (v′i(xˆi(m))−
∑
l∈Li
2p
i,l
Φ(i))ri ≤ 0⇒ v′i(xˆi(m))≤
∑
l∈Li
1p
l
i
Proof 7 (Proof of Lemma 7): At NE, we can write tˆi =
xˆi(m)
∑
l∈Li
1p
l
i and hence,
∑
i∈N tˆi ≥ 0 and mechanism
is weak budget balanced.
The individual rationality is obvious for xˆi(m) = 0. For
xˆi(m) > 0, the function ui is defined as follows,
ui(x) = vi(x)− x
∑
l∈Li
1p
l
i
Since ui(x) is strictly concave w.r.t. x and u′i(xˆi(m)) =
0, u′i(y) > 0 for 0 ≤ y < xˆi(m). We can conclude
ui(y) ≥ ui(0) and due to continuity, ui(xˆi(m)) ≥ ui(0).
Since ui(0) = vi(0) and ui(xˆi(m)) = vi(xˆi(m)) − tˆi(m),
we conclude that vi(xˆi(m))− tˆi(m) ≥ vi(0) and the result
is proved.
Proof 8 (Proof of Lemma 8): To prove the existence of
a NE, we prove that a suggested valid message is a NE.
This suggested message is generated based on the solution
of problem (2) which we know exists and is unique. We
notice that because of monotonically increasing property of
valuation functions, the solution of problem (2) always lies in
the Pareto optimal region of feasible set which in our case, is
the upper boundary of feasible set. Suppose (x∗, b∗, λ∗, µ∗)
is the solution of problem (2). We generate m as following.
First assume m satisfies all of the constraints in Lemma 3.
Further, y is set to be any scaled version of x∗ and since
x∗ is on the boundary of feasible region, xˆ(m) = x∗. In
addition, 1pli is set to be equal to µ
l
i
∗ and this is valid since
µli
∗ ≥ 0. Then, wli =
∑
j∈Gl
k(i)
1plj =
∑
j∈Gl
k(i)
µlj
∗
=
λ∗l . Also ri
1z¯
l
i = maxj∈Gl
k(i)
{riyj} = maxj∈Gl
k(i)
{xˆi} =
maxj∈Gl
k(i)
{x∗i } = blk
∗. Hence, Lemma 5 is satisfied for m.
Also, due to stationarity condition, Lemma 6 is satisfied for
m. In sum, since Lemmas 3, 5 and 6 are satisfied, we know
that the elements of the gradient vector of utility function of
each agent i w.r.t. mi is either zero (positive messages) or
not positive (zero messages) which implies that each agent
is best responding to other agents’ messages and therefore,
m is a NE.
